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~~SC-M-31~~

21 November 1951

STAFF CONFERENCE

Minutes of Meeting held in Director's
Conference Room, Administration Building
Wednesday, 21 November 1951, at 1100 hours.

General Smith Presiding

Present

Allen W. Dulles, Deputy Director
Frank G. Wisner, Deputy Director for Plans
Walter R. Wolf, Deputy Director for Administration
Joseph Larocque, Jr., Executive Assistant to the Director
Colonel Chester B. Hansen, Assistant to the Director
James D. Andrews, Advisor for Management
James M. Andrews, Asst. Director for Collection and Dissemination
Colonel Matthew Baird, Director of Training
H. Marshall Chadwell, Asst. Director for Scientific Intelligence
Brig. Gen. Trubee Davison, Director of Personnel
~~Brig. Gen.~~ Col. James H. Drum, A/Chief, Technical Services Staff, O/DD/Plans
Perry Johnson, D/Asst. Director for Communications
Col. Kilbourne Johnston, Assistant Director for Policy Coordination
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, D/Asst. Director for Special Operations
William L. Langer, Assistant Director for National Estimates
Max F. Millikan, Assistant Director for Research and Reports
James Q. Reber, Assistant Director for Intelligence Coordination
Colonel Robert Taylor, Office of Deputy Director for Plans
Colonel L. K. White, D/Assistant Director for Operations
Maj. Gen. Willard Wyman, Asst. Director for Special Operations

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1. Mr. Wisner made the following report on his recent trip with Mr. Miller and Mr. Helms:

[] Convention of CIA representatives was held in Istanbul instead of []. In consequence, no discussions were held with Embassy officials and dealings were mostly with [] on the second echelon. Mr. Wisner felt that things in [] were on a sound basis, the economy had taken strides forward and the political situation appeared stable. [] is so important geographically that there is still a large job for us to do there.

[] Discussions were held with practically all United States and [] authorities. Situation is not too satisfactory and the United States will always have to be the leader in furnishing assistance. The United States is presently in the position of practically running the [] [] is the strong man [] and is generally liked by United States military and diplomatic personnel. There is a feeling that the present uneasy coalition may split and that [] might come into power after the first of the year.

Mr. Wisner feels that during the trip they were able to help [] operatives in relation to their own government. The heads of the [] are military personnel and strong representations were made to the [] that there should be continuity of service.

Major General Hart may become the new head of the United States military mission. He was briefed by Mr. Wisner in Stuttgart.

The internal Communist situation seems to be fairly well in check and they have gone underground. In this relation the contrast between [] is very marked.

[] Unless present trends are reversed, the [] situation could be lost to the internal Communist threat. Americans in Italy, however, are aware of this, are beginning to forget their differences and are showing more signs of working together.

The economic situation is poor, the tax collection methods are bad and both are being exploited by the Communists.

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Conversations were held with Admiral Carney in regard to war planning in respect [redacted] Mr. Wisner feels that the question of bringing [redacted] directly together for war planning has been recently forgotten by the United States [redacted] Perhaps this is due to an unexpressed fear that if they get together they might decide to partition [redacted]

[redacted] Mr. Wisner found the German situation very impressive, with great economic progress and booming manufacture. He especially noted the recovery of the Deutsch Mark. In consequence, the Germans are becoming more difficult to deal with. Gen. Truscott is closely following the progress of the contractual agreements. Mr. Wisner feels that our negotiators may be unable to get what United States [redacted] wants.

The position of General Truscott is interesting and very gratifying. [redacted]

[redacted] He is not, however, able to cover Berlin as he has no man competent to coordinate the very scrambled situation in that city. CIA should give considerable thought to the provision of such a man.

CIA's mission in Germany is vital intelligence-wise. The occupation forces are dependent on early intelligence warning and CIA's responsibility is great. The OB intelligence on the Eastern Zone and also parts of Poland is excellent. Troop movements are normally known within three days.

The defector operation was carefully studied and Mr. Wisner feels it is going well. The physical set-up is excellent although heretofore the flow of defectors has been small. This is improving.

Mr. Wisner feels that press criticism of the defector operation has become so wide spread (although mostly unjustified) that it is doing active harm and deterring defection.

[redacted] The internal Communist situation is still strong but not as bad as in [redacted] The French argue constantly on a legalistic basis about Communists and declare that the Communist Party is still a legal party. We will have to keep after this.

There were numerous discussions with the [redacted] services in an attempt to get them to provide us with more intelligence. Some progress was made but we will probably have to give them something in exchange.

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[redacted]
The situation is badly scrambled in [redacted] but Mr. Wisner saw the various chiefs of the [redacted] at the same time to eliminate any possibility of jealousies or criticisms. Internal intelligence problems in [redacted] are the fault of the agencies and are primarily of a jurisdictional nature. Mr. Wisner arranged for copies of our National Security Act of 1947 to be sent to them for study.

Counterespionage service in [redacted] is having a bad time, principally due to its own fault. They have been publicizing CE matters and have been criticized by the newspapers.

England

Mr. Wisner arrived just after election, too early to observe any change in the foreign policy. He believes that some time will elapse before there are any major policy changes.

General

In general, Mr. Wisner had the impression that CIA was gaining in maturity and stature. There is greater acceptance of CIA by American officials abroad and the Agency contribution is recognized. This presents an increased responsibility to live up to this recognition. Mr. Wisner feels strongly that uncoordinated trips through Europe and the Middle East must cease. Such trips in the future must be coordinated through the Office of DD/P and the Senior Representatives advised.

2. The Director endorsed Mr. Wisner's comments on coordinated travel. As a matter of procedure, when anyone less than an Assistant Director is traveling, coordination in the future will be effected through the Office of DD/P and the Senior Representatives will always be consulted. Any other clearances such as those for military theaters will be obtained. Deputies or Assistant Directors when traveling will not have to clear with the Senior Representatives but, as a matter of courtesy, should advise them.

3. General Davison stated that although all Offices in CIA were "screaming" for personnel he had discovered that some 800 files were presently on the desks of Division Chiefs and some of them had been there as long as two months. He asked that the Assistant Directors get these moving. The Director asked General Davison to look into the cause of this delay and report to him.

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4. The Director mentioned a confidential memorandum which had been circulated to the Assistant Directors and the contents of which had evidently been "leaked". The Director is worried about our security and feels that there is too much conversation on all levels.

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